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Abstract
This paper proposes that Colonialism is a major explanation behind
today’s diﬀerences in Income Inequality among countries. We argue that
colonies that received an important number of European settlers were
characterized by a concentration of economic and political power in the
hands of these last ones. Moreover, European settlers later achieved
independence from the metropolis and were able to prolong the status
quo. Colonies where Europeans were much less present did not develop
such strong inequality. The empirical evidence we provide strongly sup-
ports our thesis.
JEL classiﬁcation: O15; O13; N90
Keywords: Colonialism, Inequality, Income distribution.
1 Introduction
In the last few years a considerable number of papers have increased our un-
derstanding of the way the colonial experience of today’s developing countries
has inﬂuenced their future economic evolution. While the analysis of many
short term issues might be safely done without considering the historical con-
text of each country, such an approach would be highly dubious for long term
problems like diﬀerences in income levels between rich and poor nations.
It is precisely their careful consideration of History in general, and of Colo-
nial History in particular, what sets papers like Acemoglu et al. (2001 and
∗Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester.
e-mail: Luis.Angeles@manchester.ac.uk. Tel: +44 161 275 4855. I thank two anonimous
referees and participants at the LACEA meeting 2003 for their very helpful comments.
12002) or Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) aside among those addressing the ques-
tion of why southern countries have not attained the economic well-being of
the world’s industrial countries. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the pat-
tern of European settlement in the colonies determined the type of institutions
that these countries developed and that these institutions are a major factor
behind their economic backwardness. In those regions where few Europeans
settled, Europeans created “extractive states” and the resulting institutions
“...did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they provide
checks and balances against government expropriation.” On the other hand,
the authors also propose that the countries that received a large number of
settlers “tried to replicate European institutions” and therefore created the
right set of rules encouraging future economic growth. European migration
to a given region was largely determined by the mortality rates that future
settlers would face. This provided the authors with an instrument to test the
eﬀect of institutions on the level of GDP per capita, namely the mortality
rates of European settlers in colonial times.
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) provide us with a convincing account of how
many of the diﬀerences in economic outcomes between the northern and the
southern part of the American Continent are rooted in colonial times. The
authors identify as the initial cause of this divergence the diﬀerences in factor
endowments that Europeans found in the New World. The southern part of
the continent, with its aptitude for sugar production and mining, started with
a much more pyramidal society than the northern one, with its family-size
agricultural units. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ “document — through comparative
studies of suﬀrage, public land and schooling policies - systematic patterns by
which societies in the Americas that began with more extreme inequality or
heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional struc-
tures that greatly advantaged members of the elite classes (...) by providing
them with more political inﬂuence and access to economic opportunities.”
The present paper places itself in the same line as the two aforementioned
ones. Like them, it studies a long run distinction between developed and
developing countries in the light of the Colonial past of the later. The object
of our study is the large diﬀerences in income inequality that exist among
countries of the world. Using the most popular measure of inequality, namely
the Gini coeﬃcient, we can observe that the countries of Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa have much higher levels of inequality than those prevailing
in Europe or Asia. The average value of the Gini coeﬃcient is 51.80 for Latin
America and 46.85 for sub-Saharan Africa while for Western Europe and South
2and East Asia the values are 31.83 and 37.71 respectively1.
The only explanation for these important diﬀerences that has ever gained
wide approval among the economics profession is the “Kuznets’ hypothesis”.
Proposed by Kuznets (1955), it asserts that inequality should evolve follow-
ing an “inverted U” pattern as countries develop. Although initial tests of
Kuznets’ hypothesis gave contrasting results2, the issue could ﬁnally be set-
tled once comprehensive time series data on inequality became available for
a large number of countries. This happened in the mid nineties thanks to
the work of Deininger and Squire (1996). Tests using this data set showed
Kuznets’ hypothesis to be wrong3.
The main proposition of this paper is that diﬀerent experiences during the
Colonial Period are a major explanation behind today’s diﬀerences in inequal-
ity among countries. In an econometric analysis we show the eﬀect to be
quantitatively large and robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. We use
an objective measure in order to diﬀerentiate the diverse colonial experiences
the World has known in the last ﬁve centuries. This measure is the percentage
of European settlers living in the colony at its apogee. We hypothesize that
the higher this percentage the greater the inequality in the country, as long as
Europeans stayed a minority.
There are only four cases where the European immigrants became the ma-
jority of the population: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States. We will refer to these countries as the “New Europes”, an appropriate
label since together with the people came much of the institutional framework
of Western Europe (these were all British colonies). These colonies were dif-
ferent from the rest of the colonial world in most aspects, one of them was
their relatively even distribution of national income.
For the rest of the World a positive relationship between European settle-
ment and inequality does exist. Basically, there were two types of strategies
adopted by the colonial powers in today’s developing countries4. The ﬁrst one,
1Calculated using the latest available data for each country. Note that these numbers
are given for illustrative purpose only since we have not taken into account diﬀerences in
income and income recipient deﬁnitions (see below).
2For instance, Ahluwalia (1976) found support for the inverted U hypothesis but this
was proved not to be robust by Anand and Kanbur (1993b).
3Deininger and Squire (1998) ﬁnd in a panel data regression with 49 countries that for 40
among them there is no statistically signiﬁcant association between income per capita and
inequality; for 5 countries there is an “inverted U” relationship and for 4 countries there is
a “U shaped” relationship.
4A similar clasiﬁcation can be found in the works of historians of colonialism. See for
instance Waites (1999).
3which lead to the creation of what we will call “Settler Colonies”, allowed a
large number of Europeans to establish themselves overseas. The ratio of Eu-
ropean to total population in these colonies was in the range of 0.10 to 0.30.
Such an important number of newcomers was able to appropriate most of the
country’s productive resources for themselves. This was especially true for the
arable land and the mining resources. The indigenous people, together with
the imported slaves which characterized many of these colonies, had much
more restricted access to land and were often left with working in the Euro-
pean’s mines or plantations as their only alternative. Accordingly, their living
standards were far below those of the European minority. These colonies were
thus characterized by very high inequality levels.
The second type of colonies received a much more reduced number of Eu-
ropeans, mainly for the purposes of administration and tax collection but nor
for running agricultural exploitations themselves. We will refer to these cases
as “Peasant Colonies” since the agricultural production stayed in the hands
of local peasants. The percentage of Europeans in these colonies was typically
well below 1 %. Although there is considerable heterogeneity in this group of
colonies we can say that as a rule inequality was not severely increased with re-
spect to pre colonial times. Europeans usually left the ownership of the land to
the indigenous people and contented themselves with taxing their production
and inducing them to shift their traditional products for more commercial ones
like tea, coﬀee or cacao. The strain put on local populations by the colonizers
was thus comparable to the one a local prince would have induced anyway5.
We hypothesize that inequality in these countries was not necessarily higher
than in non colonized ones.
We analyze empirically the eﬀect of colonialism on inequality by including
as an explanatory variable of inequality either the ratio of European settlers
to total population or dummies for each type of Colony. Both approaches give
a similar result: the eﬀect of these variables is not only statistically signiﬁcant
but also larger than that of any other variable.
Our paper distinguish itself from the ones mentioned before in important
ways. Acemoglu et al. (2001) is concerned mainly with institutions and
growth, inequality is not really analyzed. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) do
discuss the issue of inequality but they limit themselves to the American Con-
tinent and do not oﬀer a quantitative analysis like we do. We can also mention
the empirical works of Bertocchi and Canova (2002) and Grier (1999), who are
concerned with the eﬀect of colonialism on economic growth.
5There are, of course, some exceptions like the Belgian Congo where European activity
was particularly devastating.
4One aspect that the present paper does have in common with the ones by
Acemoglu et al. (2001) or Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) is that it stresses the
continuity of the colonial order after colonization was over, at least in some
places. This is at the center of the thesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001), where
one of the three premises their whole paper is based on is “The colonial state
and institutions persisted even after independence.” They are not alone in
holding this view, since many historians would agree with them. First among
them Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002), who referring to the case of Mexico say:
“The evidence obviously conforms well with the idea that in societies that
began with extreme inequality, such as Mexico, institutions evolved so as to
greatly advantage the elite in access to economic opportunities, and they thus
contributed to the persistence of that extreme inequality.”
The hypothesis that we will make is less demanding than that of Acemoglu
et al. (2001) since we will propose that the main characteristics of the colonial
period persisted after independence in the countries of important European
settlement. We do not require this for the countries where European settlement
was very low or for the “New Europes”. We will defend this and other views
we have on colonization in the following section.
Another strain of the literature that can be related to our paper treats
inequality as an endogenous outcome that depends on initial conditions and
some market imperfections. We are referring mainly to the theoretical lit-
erature on inequality and growth that developed in the nineties (and that
was accompanied by a large empirical literature). Several papers in this lit-
erature suggest that under some conditions an economy can have multiple
equilibria that greatly diﬀer in terms of both inequality and growth. Thus,
the initial conditions of the economy, for instance the initial distribution of
wealth, might lead the country into an undesirable equilibria of low growth
and high inequality. The models of Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and
Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Bénabou (1996) are good exam-
ples of this literature. These models use an imperfect credit market as the
source of their results. In Banerjee and Newman (1993), an economy with an
initial distribution of income that is strongly unequal will see a large part of
its population excluded from the credit market. This exclusion will not allow
poorer people to invest in physical and human capital, reducing the growth
rate of the economy and perpetuating the high inequality situation. Bénabou
(1996) also sees inequality as potentially self-reinforcing, but he stresses other
channels. He argues that in high inequality countries policies of redistribution
would not ﬁnd enough support from rich indivuduals since the transfers they
would be required to make would be too large with respect to the potential
5gains that stem from a faster growing economy. Other authors who have also
studied the political dimension of the problem are Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
and Persson and Tabellini (1994). Their view is somewhat opposed to that
of Bénabou (1996) in the sense that they see redistribution as a nuisance for
the economy, arguing that it implies a higher level of taxation and distorts
economic decisions.
This literature oﬀers several possible explanations for the long lasting ef-
fects of colonialism on inequality that we advocate. Credit market imperfec-
tions and redistributive issues are certainly part of the economic environment
in third world countries. These and other features could have “trapped” coun-
tries in the high inequality state in which they found themselves at the end of
the colonization era.
2 Colonization and European settlements6
Table 1 presents the number of European settlers as a percentage of total
population in the colonies. Our data comes from two main sources: Etemad
(2000) and McEvedy and Jones (1978), supplemented in a few cases by other
sources7.
As can be seen, we have classiﬁed all colonies into three groups according
to the importance of European settlement. Some countries have been put in
an “intermediate” level, between Settler and Peasant Colonies.
2.1 New Europes
The ﬁrst and most homogeneous group is the one labeled “New Europes”. In
these countries the autochthonous population was almost entirely eliminated
through diseases and wars. With the exception of the United States, where a
minority of black Africans was brought as slave workers, almost all inhabitants
were of European origin by the end of the colonial period.
The temperate climate of these countries, where “cash crops” like sugar
could not be produced, together with the absence of autochthonous laborers
greatly inﬂuenced the distribution of land - and thus of income - in them.
Except for the southern United States, the regime of big plantations that
characterized other regions was absent from these colonies. Instead, land was
available in important quantities for European immigrants and the family farm
was the typical unit of production. The average family farm in the northern
6This section borrows from Waites(1999), Etemad(2000), Bairoch(1997), Maddison
(2001) and Enciclopaedia Britannica among others.
7Our values are very similar to those given in Appendix Table A5 of Acemoglu et al.
(2001). Their numbers come mostly from McEvedy and Jones (1978).
6United States in the early XIXth century was over 100 acres (Maddison 2001).
This, together with the relative richness in human capital of these settlers,
assured most of them a high income per capita.
It is then natural to assume that inequality levels were not particularly
high in these countries in colonial times. Whatever makes these countries more
or less unequal today (the United States, for instance has one of the highest
levels of inequality among industrial countries) is probably not directly related
to their colonial experience.
2.2 Settler Colonies
“Settler Colonies”, which we formally deﬁne as the countries where Europeans
constituted between 10 and 30 percent of the colonial population, present a
larger diversity. Although many aspects set the colonies of this group aside,
we can identify two common denominators among them that are particularly
important for our argumentation. First, the European minority was able to
appropriate for themselves most of the land and mining resources in these
countries, thus creating a very disproportionate income distribution. Second,
independence in these countries was done by Europeans descendants and, we
should add, for European descendants. This implied that the privileges that
this group had obtained during the colonial period were not to be removed
with the change of political status. If anything, European descendants were
freer to impose their views and secure their advantages since they did not need
to accommodate to the orders of the metropolis anymore.
Let us review the diﬀerent colonies that can be included in this group,
noting both the diﬀerences and similitudes among them. As Table 1 reveals, a
majority of them can be found in today’s Latin America and the Caribbean.
A ﬁrst set of countries would be the sometimes called “sugar islands”, formed
by the Greater and Lesser Antilles. The autochthonous population of these
countries completely disappeared a few decades after the Europeans’ arrival.
These last ones decided to transform the islands into the world’s supplier of
sugar, the most important cash crop of the time8. Most European countries
with colonial ambitions owned at least one island in the region: Spain (Cuba,
today’s Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico), England (Jamaica, Barbados, An-
tigua, Dominica, Tobago), France (Guadalupe, Martinique, Haiti), Holland
(Curaçao, Aruba) and even Denmark (the Virgin Islands). Production in
these colonies was based on slave labour. A large number of black slaves was
imported from Africa all the way through the XIX century to work in sugar
8Sugar was by far the most important product of these countries. Other crops, like
tobacco, played minor roles.
7plantations run by a European minority. Even tough it can be argued that
the absolute income of African slaves was not lower than the one they could
have expected in Africa (because they constituted a valuable investment for
their owners so they did wanted to keep them able to work eﬀectively), there
can be no doubt about the extreme inequality prevailing in a society where a
majority of the population is enslaved.
A major colonial power absent from the Caribbean was Portugal; but this
was more than compensated by their most precious colony, which fromthe 16th
century also specialized itself in sugar production: Brazil. Just as the much
smaller territories of the Caribbean, Brazil also received several millions of
slaves through its three centuries of colonial history. Most of them came to the
northeastern region, where sugar plantations were located. In the 18th century
mining became preponderant in the Brazilian economy but the distribution of
income in this activity was as unequal as the one prevailing in the plantations.
The rest of Latin America constituted the gross of the Spanish Empire.
The center of this Empire where the two rich mining regions of Mexico and
today’s Peru and Bolivia. These were also the most heavily populated areas of
pre-colonial America, so that the autochthonous population continued to be
important even after the large decline in its number that followed the conquest.
This labor force was used by Spanish settlers in the silver mines and their
rights were not much better than those of the slaves in other parts of the
continent. In the area of the ancient Inca empire, for instance, the recruiting
of workers by force was one of the privileges accorded to the Spaniards by
the crown. Outside the mining heartlands agriculture was the main activity in
Spanish America. This was not export-driven agriculture, like in northeastern
Brazil and the Caribbean, but rather agriculture whose aim was to render
Spanish America, and particularly its ports and cities of the mining regions,
self-sustained in what concerns food. The typical production unit in these
regions was the hacienda9, a large landed estate belonging to a European
settler where laborers (typically Indians) were de facto tied to the land by a
series of debts incurred with the landlord. When the productivity of the silver
mines of Mexico and the Andes declined in the 17th century, the haciendas
became increasingly self-suﬃcient.
Unlike their counterparts in the northern side of the Continent, European
settlers in Spanish America didn’t came to work the land themselves. Their
9In Argentina the name of estancia would rather be used, while in Brazil we would
talk of fazenda. The main diﬀerence between the Spanish America´s hacienda and the
plantations of the Caribbean was that the former produced a large range of agricultural and
even manufactured goods while the last ones were specialized in one or few products for
exportation.
8aim was to obtain either a mining concession or the right to a large piece
of land that, through the work of Indians, would assure them a considerable
wealth.
The descendants of these settlers formed the social class that was to achieve
the independence of the nations of Spanish America. The criollos, name given
to the people of European race born in America, furnished not only the in-
tellectual and ﬁnancial resources needed to achieve independence; they also
formed the armies and fought the battles. Indians were very much outside of
the whole struggle, the beneﬁts of independence were not intended for them.
It should then come as no surprise that the privileges of the criollos were main-
tained or reinforced after independence. The securing of the status quo was
one of the reasons behind the independence wars.
Many similarities can be found in another colonized region where Euro-
peans formed an important minority: South Africa. Even tough Europeans
started to settle in the region as early as 1652, the Union of South Africa was
created only at the beginning of the last century. The white population was
constituted of two groups of similar size: the British and the Afrikaners, de-
scendants of the early Dutch and German settlers. The British were dominant
in the Cape region, where they controlled maritime routes, and British com-
panies had obtained monopoly rights over the mining resources of the country,
which included the world’s richest gold and diamond mines. These mines em-
ployed black Africans in great numbers, the salary of a black worker being 9
times lower than that of a white one10. Afrikaners dominated the agricultural
sector and as their number increased they concentrated most of the arable
land in their hands at the expense of black Africans. This trend became law
when in 1913 the Natives Land Act deﬁned 8 percent of the land as “reserves”
and prohibited the acquisition of land by Africans outside of them. The land
policy was complementary with the interest of the mining companies: landless
peasants had no choice but to look for work in the mining companies. So very
much like in the Latin American case, mines and land together with political
power were controlled by the European minority, giving rise to an extremely
unequal society.
The situation was similar but less extreme in the colonies north of South
Africa: today’s Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. The more we advance north
the smaller the number of white settlers the region received and therefore the
least eﬀective their control on the country’s resources. While in Zimbabwe
white settlers did obtain from the British the right of self government, the less
10See ”History of South Africa”, Encoclopaedia Britannica. 2004
9numerous ones in Zambia and Malawi were directly governed by the British
crown, who was more concerned with the well-being of Africans if only for
reputational reasons. Zimbabwe adopted in 1930 a law similar to the one
mentioned above for South Africa giving most of the land to the white minority.
The other important aspect in which the South African experience reminds
that of Latin America is the fact that political power passed from the colonial
power to the European descendants with independence. In South Africa this
was not the result of a war but rather a steady process that progressively
transferred all the government’s prerogatives to the local elite. Once this
process was achieved, the sort of the black Africans only worsened. With the
adoption of the set of policies known as apartheid inequality was assured to
last for a long time.
The postcolonial period in the other British colonies in the region is also
greatly determined by the importance of European settlements. While in
Zambia and Malawi Africans seized the power right from the early 1960s, the
larger white minority of Zimbabwe managed to keep control of the land until
the African based movements overthrew them in 1980.
The last region that can be included among our “settler colonies” is to-
day’s Algeria, and to a lesser extent Tunisia and Morocco. The migration of
European settlers to Algeria was done together with large-scale conﬁscation
of land belonging to Arabs. These last ones were forced to migrate to mar-
ginal lands which caused an important reduction of food production and even
some famines. Thus we observe some of the elements characterizing colonies
of important European settlement. A major diﬀerence with respect to South
Africa or Latin America is that independence was achieved in Algeria by the
autochthonous majority, at the cost of a destructive war. The white minority
left the country after its independence.
We conclude that the colonial and post colonial experience of our “settler
colonies” had many points in common. The accumulation of land and min-
ing resources by the white minority during colonial times was reﬂected in the
distribution of income. These settlers later obtained independence from the
colonial power by war or by decree and worked to secure their status. Uni-
versal voting rights, public education and health were all slow to spread to
the autochthonous population while the elite beneﬁted from them at an early
stage11. All these factors assured that the initial high level of inequality of
these countries was maintained over time.
11For an account of the process of extension of the franchise and of public schooling in
the Americas see Engermann and Sokolof (2002).
102.3 Peasant Colonies
Under this category we will place all colonies where the Europeans constituted
only a very small minority, usually less than 1 percent of the population. These
Europeans were typically not landowners or miners but rather administrators
or tax collectors. This is easily the largest and most heterogenous of our three
groups, and generalizations about its characteristics are more problematic.
Still, we believe that in a majority of countries some common features can be
identiﬁed, features that set the experience of these countries aside from those
of the preceding groups. First, the appropriation of land by the white minority
was small or in any case well below what could otherwise be observed in settler
colonies. This does not mean that European-run plantations were absent from
these colonies, they existed in many of them, but simply that the amount of
land they controlled was limited by the reduced number of settlers.
Europeans certainly brought many changes with them but the pressure on
the mass of the population that they exercised was not necessarily higher than
what these countries knew under local rule. Tax revenues and the commerce
of cash crops were the two main sources of revenue for the European powers in
these colonies. This meant that a well functioning colonial economy would be
in the interest of the colonizers. In general some parts of the autochthonous
population was able to beneﬁt with the colonial regime while others suﬀered.
People employed as middle men by Europeans, as well as those related to
commerce could take advantage of new possibilities. In addition, the colonial
government demanded a large range of services that could only be supplied by
the local population. On the other hand, many peasants suﬀered from high
tax rates and in some cases were forced to work in the state’s plantations or
building public infrastructure.
A second main characteristic is that after independence political power
passed from the European power to the autochthonous population, never to
the European settlers as in the cases seen above. Thus, even tough the post
colonization governments could put in place right or wrong policies, they were
in general not captured by a racially diﬀerentiated minority regarding all the
country’s resources as their own.
Below we provide a picture of the most important countries in this group
stressing the points just mentioned.
Let us begin with the most populated colonies of Asia and Africa; namely
the British India (which included today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and
Nigeria. These two countries had in common that expropriation of land by
Europeans was practically negligible. In Nigeria, as in many other colonies of
West Africa, any attempt of European settlement was discouraged and even a
11law was made to forbid them from acquiring any land in 1917 (compare with
South Africa, also a British colony, where four years earlier another law also
forbid the acquisition of land but to the Africans). In Nigeria, as in Ghana
or the Ivory Coast, the colonial power specially developed the commerce of
tropical products like cacao, peanuts and palm oil. This commerce was done
directly with local producers, who could beneﬁce from it and became small
entrepreneurs.
In a similar way, British did not take for themselves important land areas in
India, plantations were rather rare. Instead they taxed the possession of land,
just as in the Moghul empire. While this tax produced considerable revenues,
one cannot say that the British were absorbing a large part of Indian GDP.
According to Maddison (2001), the part of Indian national income after taxes
that went to the British was around 5 percent, surely much higher than their
part in total population of about 0.05 % but still relatively modest at the
aggregate level.
A diﬀerent approach was used by the Dutch in today’s Indonesia. A policy
known as the “Cultivation System” was the landmark of Dutch rule during
the 19th century. Under this system a ﬁfth of all peasants’ arable lands were
to be destined to export crops. The production of these lands served to pay
government’s taxes. In the middle of the 19th century half of the colony’s pop-
ulation were concerned by this policy. The Cultivation System was a success
from the Dutch’s point of view, Indonesia became one of the world’s most prof-
itable colonies. In what concerns the eﬀect on the local population, opinions
diﬀer. Although it is true that agricultural production increased considerably,
local peasants could hardly beneﬁt from the overseas trade which was con-
trolled by the colonizers. From the late 19th century onwards, the Cultivation
System was progressively abandoned in favor of private enterprise. European
investors were allowed to produce in the agricultural sector, with the provi-
sion that they could only lease, not buy, land from local populations. The
views on colonization had changed in the Netherlands and the future of the
autochthonous people was taken into account.
In the rest of the colonial world large plantations run by Europeans were
rather the exception than the rule. There are of course some examples like Sri
Lanka, with the production of tea, and Malaysia, with the production of tin
and rubber, where European plantations came to dominate the economy; but
these cases are a minority. The regions where European presence was more
limited and economic production stayed largely in the hands of local people
are larger and more numerous: the Sahel, West Africa, East Africa (except
12some regions in Kenya), Indochina. The Congo region constitutes a separate
case. Private companies received concessions from the estate to exploit these
countries’ resources and were given the right to impose labour coercion. This
was probably the African region that suﬀered the most from European colo-
nialism; famines and demographic regression were the ﬁnal consequences of an
exploitation of African labour taken to the extreme.
To summarize, in this section we have argued that colonial experiences
can be classiﬁed into three types: New Europes, Settler Colonies and Peasants
Colonies. The group to which a particular ex colony belongs is determined
by the percentage of European settlers in total population at colonial times.
Of these three groups, one presents two characteristics that are particularly
relevant for a study of inequality. This is the one of Settler Colonies, where
Europeans formed an important minority of the population. In these countries
colonization brought an extreme concentration of productive assets, mainly
land and mining resources, into the hands of European settlers. Moreover,
independence from the metropolis was achieved precisely by these settlers; and
one of its aims was to maintain the elite’s political and economic preeminence
in these countries. This is why these colonies became very unequal societies
and stayed like that until today.
In the other two sets of countries the eﬀects on inequality where less dra-
matic and not necessarily negative. Even if Europeans had as only goal the
extraction of as much income as possible from their Peasants Colonies (and we
are not claiming that this was the case), their presence in these countries was
simply not important enough to assure them a very large part of the colonies’
GDP. Only in the few cases where Europeans resolved themselves to a system-
atic use of violence could such a goal be achieved. Otherwise, Europeans used
the more conventional approach of taxing; leaving the economy in the hands
of the autochthonous and eventually allowing them to beneﬁt from the new
opportunities. Furthermore, in these countries we don’t observe systematically
that a particular racial minority seized all political power after independence
(although, to be sure, this is far from a guarantee for good government).
In the next section we will use data on inequality to test for a positive
relationship between European settlement and inequality levels among all ex-
colonies except the “New Europes”.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Methodology, assumptions and results
13In this section we use a comprehensive set of data to test the link between
inequality and colonialism that we hypothesized above.
The measure of inequality that we will use in most regressions is the Gini
coeﬃcient, a measure for which we have a total of 1062 observations distributed
among 139 countries in the period from 1947 to 1998. In order to assure that
our results hold for other inequality measures we also use the ratio of the share
of income of the richest to the poorest quintile of the population. This measure,
while also popular, contains less information than the Gini coeﬃcient, which
considers the whole income distribution and not just the extremes. The data
on inequality is taken from the “World Income Inequality Database” (WIID)
from the United Nations (see U.N. 2000); which has been formed by expanding
the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set. We have selected from this data set
the observations that cover both the whole population and the whole area of
the country and that are characterized as “Reliable data” (in opposition to
some observations which are called “less reliable data”). For each country
we have formed the longest possible series of observations, the source of the
observations changes for any given country over time.
The Gini coeﬃcients as they are given in the WIID are not directly compa-
rable since they are calculated from diﬀerent concepts of income (like expen-
diture, gross income or net income) and because they are referred to diﬀerent
income recipients units (households or persons). This is an important fac-
tor since the distribution of, say, net income diﬀers considerable from that of
gross income. We deal with this problem in the same way as Li, Squire and
Zou (1998) (and many others after them) did : we include a dummy variable
for these characteristics in each one of the regressions. We use three dummy
variables to control for the eﬀect of having as type of income respectively ex-
penditure, net income or monetary income instead of gross income. We also
include two dummy variables to control for the eﬀects of having as the income
recipient unit the individual or the “Household or Family equivalent” instead
of the Household or the Family.
The basic regression we are running is the following:
Ineqi,t = α0 + α1ESeti + α2NewEuropei +
J ￿
j=1
βjXi,t +
5 ￿
k=1
γjDi,t + εi,t (1)
where Ineqi,t is the Gini coeﬃcient of income (or the ratio of income of
the highest and lowest quintiles) , ESeti is the percentage of Europeans in
total population in colonial times for all colonized countries except the New
Europes, NewEuropei is a dummy for these colonies, Xi,t is a list of control
14variables that have been used in many diﬀerent studies of inequality and Di,t
are the dummies controlling for the diﬀerent types of data.
The list of control variables is the following (see the Appendix for data
sources):
- GDP per capita and its square, to search for a “Kuznet’s curve”.
- The amount of credit to the private sector by banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions as percentage of GDP. This is a measure of the development of
the Financial Sector.
- Secondary school (gross) enrollment ratios in 1970. When the regression
includes this variable the sample starts in 1970, so that this variable can be
considered as the initial secondary school enrollment.
- The percentage of the population between 40 and 59 years old12.
- The inﬂation rate (mean over the last 5 years, inﬂation in consumer’s
prices).
- Arable land per capita, in hectares.
- Measure of Political rights (mean over the last 5 years).
- Dummy for communist countries.
- Dummies for Latin American and sub-Saharan countries.
- Dummies for the identity of the colonizing power.
The assumption we make about equation (1) is that there is no endogeneity
problem concerning the percentage of European settlers and the dummy for
New Europes. This requires that the number of Europeans that settled in
the colonies were not a function of inequality levels today or of any variable
aﬀecting inequality today that is omitted in equation (1). This assumption
can be put into question. In particular, one might want to think of a common
factor for both the European settlements and the level of inequality that is
not included among our list of regressors. A candidate for such a factor would
be the climatic characteristics and the natural endowments of the country. If
we think of sugar cane production for instance, one could argue that a warm
12This variable was used by Higgins and Williamson (1999) in their study of the determi-
nants of inequality. The logic of their argument is the following: it is well known from labor
economics that wages increase with age, and this is a source of inequality. If we admit that
the labor supply of persons from diﬀerent ages are imperfect substitutes, then we can argue
that if the number of people in a given age group increases then the wage of the people in
that group will decrease (by an excess supply argument). This means that if the percentage
of people in the age group with the highest wage increases then income inequality should
decrease. The age group with the highest wages is precisely the 40 to 59 years old. We’ll
call this variable “Mature”.
15climate and appropriate land is the ultimate cause for having a sugar producing
economy -which creates an unequal distribution of income- and a large number
of European settlers - who would be attracted by the prospective proﬁts of this
activity. In this sense, the argument would go, European settlement is not the
ultimate cause of high inequality since this would have existed anyway given
the country’s propensity to sugar cane production.
The above argument seems ﬂawed to us. The problem lies in the fact that
climate and natural endowments will not imply any given type of economic
activity and distribution of income without human intervention. It turns out
that the history of sugar cane production is revealing on this area. In the cen-
tury leading to the discovery of the Americas by Columbus, Spain and Portugal
had progressively expanded their areas of inﬂuence into the Atlantic and north-
ern Africa; conquering several islands like Madeira (Portugal) and the Canary
islands (Spain). These possessions had an adequate climate for sugar cane
production and indeed, Iberians started to create plantations and to import
African slaves into them13. This process was aborted when sugar production
shifted to the newly discovered colonies of the Americas, and Madeira and the
Canary islands eventually became populated almost completely by Europeans.
Thus, it is the actions of men - and more speciﬁcally of European settlers -
that set these islands apart from their counterparts in the Caribbean and that
constitute the ultimate cause of their income distribution.
Even tough we believe that our assumption of no endogeneity problem
concerning the ESet variable is justiﬁed, we will try to control for the type of
eﬀects mentioned in the last paragraph by including a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 for the colonies that used slave force. This variable is closely
related to some key climatic aspects of the country, namely the suitability of
developing sugar cane or tobacco exploitations. Moreover, this variable will be
useful to ensure that the percentage of European settlers is not just “picking
up” the eﬀect of being a former slave colony.
Another issue is the fact that our variable for European settlers is very
probably measured with error. However, this should not be a source of worry
since it produces only a bias towards zero in the estimates. As we will see, the
coeﬃcients we obtain for the ESet variable are large and signiﬁcant anyway, so
if we could observe this variable without measurement errors our conclusions
would only be stronger.
Endogeneity problems might exist for our control variables. One can be
13On this subject see Phillips and Phillips (1992).
16especially suspicious about the variable measuring the development of the
ﬁnancial sector, the ratio of credit to GDP. As Clarke et al. (2002) have
noted, reverse causality is a concern with this variable since it is natural to
think that in a less unequal society more people will have access to the ﬁnancial
system. In other words, the amount of credit would depend on inequality.
Since this can potentially bias our result we will also consider an instrumental
variables estimation where, as in Clarke et al. (2002), we use the La Porta et
al. (1998) set of dummies identifying the origin of the country’s legal system
as an instrument for the development of the ﬁnancial sector.
Our ﬁrst results are given in Table 2. This series of regressions strongly
supports our hypothesis about the eﬀects of European settlements on inequal-
ity. As can be seen, the regression that includes as explanatory variables only
the percentage of European settlers and a dummy for the “New Europes”
manages to explain 50 percent of the variation of the endogenous variable.
Moreover, as we progressively include all our control variables the coeﬃcient
on the percentage of European settlers remains signiﬁcant at the 1 % level and
its value stabilizes at a level between 0.35 and 0.40. This value implies that a
colony where white settlers constituted 25 % of the population would have a
Gini coeﬃcient about 10 points higher than one where European settlements
were negligible. This is a very large eﬀect, remember that the diﬀerence be-
tween low inequality countries in Europe and high inequality ones in Latin
America or Africa are in the 15 to 20 Gini points range. The dummy for the
“New Europes” is always small and becomes statistically non signiﬁcant once
several controls are added. This is also in accordance with the description of
the colonial experience of these countries.
On the last four columns of this table we rerun some regressions using the
instrument for the development of the ﬁnancial sector mentioned above. As
we can see there are almost no changes in the estimated coeﬃcient so our
conclusions remain the same.
In Table 3 we consider the same regressions of Table 2 but instead of using
as explanatory variable the percentage of European settlers we include two
dummy variables: one for Settler colonies and one for Peasant colonies14. The
14To create these two dummy variables we have separated all colonies (besides the New
Europes) in two groups: those where the percentage of Europeand settlers was above 10 %
and those where it was below this limit. Thus, in terms of our discussion in section 2, we
have included the colonies with an “intermediate” number of European settlers (between
1 and 10 %) among the Peasant colonies. To ensure that this is not a problem we have
rerun the regressions using 4 % instead of 10 % to create the dummies. The results go
unchallenged (not shown in the table).
17results are very similar to those in Table 2. The coeﬃcient on settler colonies
is always signiﬁcant at the 1 % level and its value is large, ranging from
16.91 when no controls are added to around 8 when controls are present. The
coeﬃcient on peasants colonies takes much lower values and it is not always
statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the “New Europes” is, as in the
previous table, close to zero and usually non signiﬁcant. As before, the IV
regressions give essentially the same picture.
Table 4 repeats the regressions of Tables 2 and 3 once again, this time
changing the dependent variable for the ratio of the share of income of the
richest to the poorest quintile of the population. Once again, the statistical
signiﬁcance of the variable measuring the percentage of European settlers in
total population is always strong. Since the ratio of the richest to the poorest
quintile is a more volatile measure than the Gini coeﬃcient the regressions
that use this variable have a somewhat smaller explanatory power. But the
fact is that our central hypothesis continues to be veriﬁed when we measure
inequality in another way.
In what concerns our control variables several points can be stressed. First,
most coeﬃcients look fairly stable along diﬀerent regressions, taking similar
values as we add more variables. Being a communist country has a strong
negative eﬀect on inequality in all regression where the dependent variable
is the Gini coeﬃcient; but its statistical signiﬁcance is lost when we use the
quintiles ratio instead. Two variables that are consistently associated with
lower inequality are initial secondary school enrollment and the fraction of the
population in the 40 to 59 years old range; conﬁrming our priors about their
eﬀect. On the other hand, the amount of credit for the private sector - which
stands for the development of the Financial Sector - does not have the sign
one would expect. Its coeﬃcient is positive, meaning that a more developed
Financial Sector is associated with higher, not lower inequality. When we
instrument this variable with the dummies for the origin of the legal system
the coeﬃcients are somewhat smaller and can become negative, but no clear
conclusion can be drawn.
Also with a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient are the Political
Rights variable and the Arable land per capita. Inﬂation does have the right
(positive) sign but its coeﬃcient is statistically non signiﬁcant. Finally, the
GDP per capita is not statistically signiﬁcant while its square is, and their ef-
fect corresponds to a “U-shaped” relationship between inequality and income,
thus rejecting “Kuznet’s hypothesis”.
Perhaps a more pertinent way to look at our results is to compare the eﬀect
18that a change in our explanatory variables would produce on inequality. This
is done in Table 5, where we have calculated the change in the Gini coeﬃcient
following a one standard deviation change in every variable (except for dummy
variables and for those were we noted otherwise). The values in this table were
obtained using the coeﬃcients estimated in the last OLS regression of Table
2. The main message of this table is that there are two variables whose eﬀects
on inequality are clearly above the rest. These are the percentage of European
settlers on colonial times and having a communist regime. Having a quarter of
its population of European origin instead of zero can be associated with a Gini
coeﬃcient 9 points higher, while communist countries can be expected to have
an inequality level 11.85 points lower ceteris paribus. For all other variables the
eﬀects are considerable lower, all but secondary school enrollment are below
the 2 Gini points mark.
We believe that Table 5 conveys an important message. The main causes
behind large diﬀerences in inequality between countries are to be found in
drastic historical events that dramatically reshaped the social and economic
structure of the countries. Two of these events were colonialism (when accom-
panied by an important inﬂow of European settlers) and communism. Other
type of factors like education, inﬂation or political rights, might be useful ex-
plaining the (comparatively smaller) changes in inequality within a country
over time but they are less relevant to the question of why some countries are
much more unequal than others.
3.2 Robustness checks
We will submit our results to three further robustness checks. Starting from
equation (1) with all control variables, we will include by turn three sets of
dummy variable whose eﬀect could be at the root of the large and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of our ESet variable. The results are presented in Table 6.
The ﬁrst column of this Table includes dummies for both Latin American
and sub-Saharan African countries. It could be argued that our variable for
European settlement is just picking up some “special” features of these two
regions. The data does not support this idea, the coeﬃcient on ESet remains
highly signiﬁcant and even larger than in some of the regressions in Table 2.
The dummy for Latin America is small and non signiﬁcant while the one for
sub-Saharan Africa is large and statistically signiﬁcant. This reﬂects the fact
that the explanation we provide in this paper does a good job in explaining
high inequality in Latin America but less of a good one in what concerns
Africa. While the southern cone of the African continent seems to correspond
quite well to the group of heavily settled and highly unequal countries, the
19picture is more contrasted in the rest of the continent. Many Peasant colonies
in Africa have, as we would predict, relative low level of inequality: the Gini
coeﬃcient in Ghana is around 33, in Uganda 39 and in Rwanda only 29. But
other countries that received comparably low numbers of European settlers
show much higher levels of inequality: in Gabon, Kenya and Guinea Bissau
the Gini coeﬃcient is close to 60. We note simply that we never intended to
oﬀer an exclusive explanation of inequality around the world. Other aspects
must be in place in these cases, like the pre-colonial level of inequality of these
societies, for which we cannot control for.
The second column of Table 6 introduces dummies for the identity of the
colonial power. As we can see, the dummies for Spanish, French and British
colonies have all relatively small eﬀects and their coeﬃcients are not signif-
icant while the coeﬃcient on the percentage of European settlers is almost
unchanged. This supports the general view on colonialism that this paper
takes, namely that the determinant aspect of the colonial experience concern-
ing inequality is the presence or absence of numerous European settlers, and
not whether the country was colonized by Spain instead of England. A simi-
lar conclusion is expressed in Acemoglu et al. (2001), who also ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcients on dummies that identify the colonial power turn out to be non
signiﬁcant.
The last column of Table 6 includes a dummy for the colonies where slaves
were imported in great numbers. This group includes the Caribbean countries,
Brazil and the United States. As we discussed before, one might be tempted
to believe that it is the fact of being a slave colony, and not the fact of having
a large number of European settlers, that is behind our results. Moreover, the
dummy for slave colonies might also control for some climatic characteristics
that have been left out of the regressions. The regression shows that the ESet
variable is still signiﬁcant at the 1 % level and the coeﬃcient stays in the
same range as those obtained in Table 2. Thus, the eﬀect of being a Settler
colony goes beyond the fact of having developed slave plantations or not. We
also notice that the dummy for slave colonies is signiﬁcant and its eﬀect is
important. As we could have expected, a country marked by a history of
slavery will have typically higher levels of inequality.
Another potential concern is that we have not counted as colonized coun-
tries any of the republics that formed the ancient Soviet Union. To be sure that
this is not biasing our results we have repeated our regressions excluding all
the former republics of the Soviet Union except Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
(which can hardly be qualiﬁed as regions colonized by the Russian empire).
The estimated coeﬃcients don’t suﬀer any major change so the conclusions
20continue to hold (not shown in the table).
4 Conclusions
Our paper’s main point is that Colonial History is a major explanatory factor
behind today’s large diﬀerences in inequality among the world’s countries.
We have reviewed the diﬀerent colonial experiences of the last ﬁve centuries
and have classiﬁed them in 3 broad categories. Of these three, we argued
that one clearly produced and sustained highly unequal societies. This high-
inequality group is the one where colonialism brought into the country an
amount of European settlers whose number was considerable but still inferior
to that of the local population. This minority was able to concentrate most
of the countries’ income in their hands, mainly by excluding the rest of the
population from owning land or mining resources. Moreover, and with the
exception of Algeria, it was this minority who took all political power once
these countries became independent. This allowed high inequality to remain
a characteristic of these countries up to our times.
We believe that the empirical evidence strongly advocates our view. The
number of European settlers as a percentage of total population has clearly
a statistically signiﬁcant and an economically substantial eﬀect on inequality.
The eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of a large number of control variables and
dummies taking into account the identity of the colonizer and the region of
the world where the country is located.
One might be tempted to infer, given the above conclusions, that European
settlement was a negative phenomenon for the countries where it took place
(excluding the four cases of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.S.)
since the society that came out of these countries was highly unequal. In
addition, one could add that such a message is in contradiction with the results
of Acemoglu et al. (2001), where more European settlements have rather
positive consequences since they are associated with better institutions and
thus with a higher level of GDP per capita.
My view is that we should not try to draw simplistic conclusions out of
a complex issue like the eﬀects of colonialism. Furthermore, there is no con-
tradiction whatsoever between the fact that settler colonies became highly
unequal and the one that these same colonies achieved a higher level of pro-
duction per capita. This relative economic success was precisely the resultant
of the Europeans settlers’ growth record. By their cultural background they
were able to put at least partially in place the technology and institutions that
made the economic superiority of Europe and the New Europes.
21It should also be kept in mind that the higher inequality of the former
settler colonies does not imply that the poorer majority of these countries is
less well-oﬀ in absolute terms than the people from the less unequal peasant
colonies. Inequality is a relative concept and it doesn’t inform us about the
absolute level of GDP per capita. There exists a trickle-down eﬀect in the
former settler colonies since the rich minority demands and consumes many
services provided by the poor and in this way makes them proﬁt at least in
part of their well being. If this eﬀect is strong enough then it might be better
to be poor in a former Settler Colony than in a former Peasant Colony, at
least in what concerns absolute levels of income.
A ﬁnal comment on the “Kuznets’ hypothesis” is also in order. Our paper
tells us that the Colonial experience of developing countries is of the high-
est relevance when analyzing inequality issues while the level of development,
measured by an indicator like GDP per capita, is not. The empirical record
refutes the “inverted-U” relationship between inequality and income while it
supports the one between inequality and European settlement. It might then
come as a surprise that some intellectual support for the ideas we present
here can be found in the same paper of 1955 where Simon Kuznets formu-
lates his famous hypothesis. Kuznets had certainly noted that his analysis
was not appropriate for every country in the world and that there was some-
thing particular about some colonized regions. On page 21 of Kuznets (1955)
we read that he is excluding of his analysis countries that are characterized
by “... large native populations with small enclaves of nonnative, privileged
minorities, e.g. Kenya and Rhodesia, where income inequality, because of the
excessively high income shares of the privileged minority, is appreciably wider
than even in the underdeveloped countries cited above.” The problem is that
this case of a small enclave of nonnative, privileged minority is far from being
an exception and concerns an important number of developing countries in the
world. Kuznets, after all, had seen it right.
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24A Data sources
• Gini coeﬃcients: WIID(World Income Inequality Database), U.N. (2000)
• Percentage of European settlers in colonial times: see Table 1.
• GDP per capita: World Bank(2002)
• Credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP: Beck et al. (2000).
This variable has been used in the study of inequality of Clarke et al.
(2002).
• Secondary school (gross) enrollment ratios in 1970: World Bank(2002).
Variable used by Li et al. (1998).
• Percentage of the population between 40 and 59 years old: U.S. census
bureau and U.N. Demographic Yearbook (various issues). This variable
was used by Higgins and Williamson (1999).
• The inﬂation rate (mean over the last 5 years, inﬂation in consumer’s
prices): World Bank(2002).
• Arable land per capita: World Bank(2002). Variable used by Bour-
guignon and Morrison (1998).
• Measure of Political rights: mean over the last 5 years of the score for
“Political rights” given in the “Freedom in the World” yearly publication,
Gastil (various years).
• All mentioned dummies: author’s calculations.
25Table 1. Percentage of European Settlers in the Colonies
Country European Settlers Year Source
as a percentage of
total population
New Europes
(percentage of European
settlers higher than 50 %)
Australia 98.6 1913 Etemad (2000)
Canada 98.1 1913 Etemad (2000)
New Zealand 95.1 1913 Etemad (2000)
United States 79.54 1760 Etemad (2000)
Settler Colonies
(percentage of Europeans
between 10 and 30 %)
Mexico 15.18 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Central America 20 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Dominican Republic 20 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Colombia, Venezuela 20 to 25 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia 30 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Paraguay 25 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Brazil 25 1822 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Chile, Argentina 21.42 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
South Africa, Lesotho 21.4 1913 Etemad (2000)
Algeria 14.3 1913 Etemad (2000)
Trinidad and Tobago 15 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Barbados 14.56 1834 Encyclopaedia Britannica
Percentage of Europeans
between 1 and 10 %
Zimbabwe 8.57 1953 Etemad (2000) and E.B.
Zambia 3.07 1952 Etemad (2000) and E.B.
Malawi 3 1900 Acemoglu et al. (2001)
26Country European Settlers Year Source
as a percentage
of total population
Tunisia 7.9 1913 Etemad (2000)
Morocco 3.1 1939 Etemad (2000)
Hong Kong 4 1900 Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Singapore 5 1900 Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Jamaica 6.25 1800 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Bahamas 10 McEvedy and Jones (1978)
Korea 1.8 1913 Etemad (2000)
Taiwan 3.9 1913 Etemad (2000)
Peasant Colonies
(percentage of European
settlers below 1 %)
India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal 0.1 1913 Etemad (2000)
Indonesia 0.3 1913 Etemad (2000)
Vietnam, Cambodia 0.1 1913 Etemad (2000)
Malaysia 0.5 1913 Etemad (2000)
French Colonies in
sub-Saharan Africa 0.2 1913 Etemad (2000)
British Colonies in
sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 1913 Etemad (2000)
Belgian Colonies in
sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 1913 Etemad (2000)
Note: : for Korea and Taiwan the number corresponds to the percentage
of Japanese settlers.
27T a b l e   2    
E f f e c t s   o f   c o l o n i a l i s m   o n   i n e q u a l i t y   u s i n g   t h e   p e r c e n t a g e   o f   E u r o p e a n   s e t t l e r s. 
 
D e p e n d e n t   v a r i a b l e :   g i n i   c o e f f i c i e n t   o f   t h e   d i s t r i b u t i o n   o f   i n c o m e 
 
 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
P e r c e n t a g e   o f   E u r o p e a n 
s e t t l e r s 
 
0.72***  0.62***  0.44***  0.33***  0.37***  0.36***  0.43***  0.33***  0.37***  0.36*** 
N e w  -  E u r o p e s    d u m m y  -2.10***  -3.17***  0.24  -0.42  -2.30*  -1.07  0.27  -0.40  -2.30  -1.05 
C o m m u n i s t   d u m m y    -8.47***  -10.02***  -8.77***  -10.30***  -11.85***  -10.12**  -8.81**  -10.30**  -11.85*** 
P r i v a t e   c r e d i t      0.007  0.019***  0.023***  0.0  -0.004  0.016*  0.023**  -0.0004 
S e c o n d a r y   s c h o o l i n g   in   
1 9 7 0      
-0.149***  -0.107***  -0.103***  -0.107*** 
-0.142*** 
-0.106***  -0.103***  -0.107*** 
M a t u r e        -0.48***  -0.46***  -0.34***    -0.47***  -0.46***  -0.34*** 
I n f l a t i o n        0.0057*  0.0052*  0.0050    0.0055**  0.0052**  0.0050** 
A r a b l e   l a n d   p e r   c a p i t a          2.81***  2.57***      2.80***  2.56*** 
P o l i t i c a l   r i g h t s          0.39*  0.81***      0.39*  0.81*** 
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a            -0.00017        -0.000175 
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a   s q u a r e d            8.60*10
-9 ***        8.59*10
-9 ** 
                     
                       
S a m p l e    1947-1998  1947 -1997  1970 -1997  1970 -1997  1977 -1997  1977 -1997  1970 -1997  1970 -1997  1977 -1997  1977 -1997 
C o u n t r i e s   i n c l u d e d   139  139  92  84  82  82  92  84  82  82 
N u m b e r   o f   o b s.  1062  1062  601  576  479  470  601  576  479  470 
                       
 R
2    0.50  0.54  0.66  0.68  0.70  0.72         
 
W h i t e   h e t e r o s c e d a s t i c i t y - c o n s i s t e n t   s t a n d a r d   e r r o r s    
h a v e   b e e n   u s e d.   * , **  a n d  ***  d e n o t e s   s i g n i f i c a n c e   a t    
10% ,  5% a n d  1%  l e v e l s . 
 
28 T a b l e   3  
E f f e c t s   o f   c o l o n i a l i s m   o n   i n e q u a l i t y   u s i n g   d u m m i e s   f o r   e a c h   t y p e   o f   c o l o n y. 
 
D e p e n d e n t   v a r i a b l e :   g i n i   c o e f f i c i e n t   o f   t h e   d i s t r i b u t i o n   o f   i n c o m e 
 
 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
S e t t l e r    C o l o n y   d u m m y 
 
16.91***  14.84***  11.18***  7.99***  9.40***  7.96***  10.99***  7.99***  9.40***  7.96*** 
P e a s a n t    C o l o n y   d u m m y  5.44***  4.29***  3.36***  1.66  3.03**  1.41  3.19***  1.65  3.03**  1.41 
N e w  -  E u r o p e s    d u m m y  - 0.17  - 1.55*  0.64  0.14  -1.83  -1.11  0.63  -0.13  -1.83  -1.10 
C o m m u n i s t   d u m m y    - 7.56***  - 9.87***  - 8.79***  -10.04***  -11.59***  -9.99**  -8.84**  -10.04**  -11.59*** 
P r i v a t e   c r e d i t      0.010  0.021***  0.025***  0.002  -0.0003  0.018**  0.025***  0.002 
S e c o n d a r y   s c h o o l i n g   in   
1 9 7 0      
-0.124***  -0.098***  -0.093***  -0.101***  -0.119***  -0.097***  -0.093***  -0.101*** 
M a t u r e        - 0.44***  -0.38***  -0.34***    -0.44***  -0.38***  -0.34*** 
I n f l a t i o n        0.008**  0.007**  0.007**    0.007***  0.007***  0.007** 
A r a b l e   l a n d   p e r   c a p i t a          2.82***  2.52***      2.82***  2.51*** 
P o l i t i c a l   r i g h t s          0.30  0.70***      0.30  0.70*** 
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a            -0.00014        -0.00013 
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a   s q u a r e d            7.27*10
-9 ***        7.26*10
-9 *** 
                     
                       
S a m p l e    1947-1998  1947 -1997  1970 -1997  1970 -1997  1977 -1997  1977 -1997  1970 -1997  1970 -1997  1977 -1997  1977 -1997 
C o u n t r i e s   i n c l u d e d   139  139  92  84  82  82  92  84  82  82 
N u m b e r   o f   o b s.  1062  1062  601  576  479  470  601  576  479  470 
                       
 R
2    0.52  0.55  0.66  0.68  0.69  0.72         
 
W h i t e   h e t e r o s c e d a s t i c i t y - c o n s i s t e n t   s t a n d a r d   e r r o r s    
h a v e   b e e n   u s e d.   * , **  a n d  ***  d e n o t e s   s i g n i f i c a n c e   a t    
10% ,  5% a n d  1%  l e v e l s . 
 
29T a b l e   4    
E f f e c t s   o f   c o l o n i a l i s m   o n   i n e q u a l i t y.   M e a s u r e   o f   i n e q u a l i t y :   r a t i o  
o f   s h a r e   o f   i n c o m e   o f   h i g h e s t   t o   l o w e s t   q u i n t i l e.  
 
 
D e p e n d e n t   v a r i a b l e :   r a t i o   o f   s h a r e   o f   i n c o m e   o f   h i g h e s t   a n d   l o w e s t   q u i n t i l e s. 
 
 
P e r c e n t a g e   o f   E u r o p e a n 
s e t t l e r s 
 
0.39***  0.36***  0.25***  0.19***  0.18***  0.18*** 
N e w  -  E u r o p e s    d u m m y  0.40  - 0.23  1.36*  0.75  0.23  0.38 
C o m m u n i s t   d u m m y    -3.34***  -2.61  -0.75  -0.44  -0.68 
P r i v a t e   c r e d i t      0.0062  0.017***  0.019***  0.008 
S e c o n d a r y   s c h o o l i n g   in   
1 9 7 0      
-0.071***  -0.028*  -0.041**  0.045** 
M a t u r e        -0.36***  -0.35***  -0.30*** 
I n f l a t i o n        0.015***  0.016***  0.015*** 
A r a b l e   l a n d   p e r   c a p i t a          0.77  0.85 
P o l i t i c a l   r i g h t s          -0.12  -0.057 
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a            7.60*10
-5 
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a   s q u a r e d            4.64*10
-9 
             
               
S a m p l e    1947-1998  1947 -1997  1970 -1997  1970 -1997  1977 -1997  1977 -1997 
C o u n t r i e s   i n c l u d e d   118  118  77  70  70  70 
N u m b e r   o f   o b s.  669  669  366  347  283  278 
               
 R
2    0.30  0.32  0.35  0.49  0.51  0.51 
 
W h i t e   h e t e r o s c e d a s t i c i t y - c o n s i s t e n t   s t a n d a r d   e r r o r s    
h a v e   b e e n   u s e d.   * , **  a n d  ***  d e n o t e s   s i g n i f i c a n c e   a t    
10% ,  5% a n d  1%  l e v e l s . 
 
D e p e n d e n t   v a r i a b l e :   r a t i o   o f   s h a r e   o f   i n c o m e   o f   h i g h e s t   a n d   l o w e s t   q u i n t i l e s. 
 
30Table 5 
Effects of explanatory variables on inequality. 
 
Variable 
 
 
Increase in 
the gini 
coefficient 
 
Percentage of European settlers 
(passing from 0 % to 25 %) 
 
  9.00 
 
 
Communist dummy    - 11.85   
 
   
 
 
       
New Europes dummy 
   
- 1.07 
 
Private credit 
   
 
 
0.19 
 
Secondary schooling in 1970 
 
- 2.52 
 
 
Mature 
   
  - 1.81 
 
Inflation 
   
  0.38 
 
Arable land per capita 
   
0.88 
 
Political rights 
   
1.60 
 
GDP per capita 
(largest possible effect)   
- 0.91 
 
       
         
     
 
These are the effects of a one standard error increase of the explanatory variable  
on the Gini coefficient, except for dummy variables and where indicated. 
The effects are obtained using the coefficients in the last OLS regression in Table 2. 
 
31Table 6 
Robustness checks 
 
Dependent variable: gini coefficient of the distribution of income 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Percentage of European settlers  0.45***  0.47***  0.35*** 
         
New Europes dummy    - 0.80  - 0.85  -3.32** 
Communist dummy    - 11.81***  - 12.04***  -12.60*** 
Private credit      0.010  0.00015  -0.008 
Secondary schooling in 1970  - 0.073***  - 0.106***  -0.132*** 
Mature      - 0.22**  - 0.29**  -0.24** 
Inflation      0.0044  0.0026  0.0002 
Arable land per capita    2.19***  2.61***  3.88*** 
Political rights    0.56**  0.80***  0.94*** 
GDP per capita    - 0.00034***  - 0.00021  -0.00013 
GDP per capita squared    1.02x10
-8***  9.34x10
-9***  8.25x10
-9*** 
 
Latin American dummy      - 0.61 
   
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  6.62***     
 
Dummy for Spanish colonies   
 
- 2.09 
 
Dummy for French colonies    1.36   
Dummy for British colonies    1.64   
 
Dummy for slave colonies        6.50*** 
 
           
Sample      1977 -1997  1977 -1997  1977-1997 
Countries included     82  82  82 
Number of obs.    470  470  470 
           
 R
2      0.74  0.73  0.74 
White heteroskedasticity - consistent standard errors have been used. 
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